Abstract Principals, such as voters or districts, typically bene…t by strategically delegating their bargaining and voting power to representatives di¤erent from themselves. There are con ‡icting views in the literature, however, of whether such a delegate should be "conservative" (status quo biased) or instead "progressive" relative to his electorate. I show how the answer depends on the political system in general and the majority requirement in particular. A larger majority requirement leads to "conservative" delegation and hence a status-quo bias, but optimal delegation is always achieved by the appropriate voting rule. The model is simple and can be employed, for example, to compare decentralization and centralization.
Introduction
Political decisions are made by delegates, not the citizens themselves. In most legislatures, every district is represented by a delegate who, on its behalf, negotiates and votes on whether certain policies should be approved. Each district may have an incentive to strategically elect a representative that is biased one way or the other. What determines the incentives to delegate strategically? Do they depend on the political system? Can institutions be designed to ensure "optimal" delegation?
Strategic delegation may be costly from a social point of view: If the delegates are "conservative" (status quo biased), they tend not to implement projects even if they are socially optimal. If, instead, the delegates are "progressive" (public-good lovers), they implement projects even if these are too costly. Strategic delegation may thus separate voters' preferences from those of the politicians, leading to a "democratic de…cit", a characteristic often attributed to the European Union (EU), for example. It is thus highly important to understand when and how voters strategically appoint representatives.
Unfortunately, there are contradictions in the literature on delegation. Starting with Schelling (1956) , a large bargaining literature shows how principals delegate to status quo biased agents to gain "bargaining power". Such agents are less desperate in reaching an agreement and, therefore, able to negotiate a better deal.
On the other hand, a more recent literature in political economy argues that "voters attempt to increase the probability that their district is included in the winning coalition by choosing a representative who values public spending more" (Chari, Jones and Marimon, 1997, p. 959) . The majority coalition will typically consist of the winners, i.e., the representatives who are least costly to please (as in Ferejohn, Fiorina and McKelvey, 1987) . And, being a member of the majority coalition is important, since this shares the surplus and expropriates the minority whose votes it does not need. To increase the "political power" (the probability of being a member of the majority coalition), districts should therefore delegate progressively -not conservatively.
This paper illuminates this contradiction by presenting a model that captures both the incentives to delegate conservatively (to gain bargaining power) and progressively (to gain political power). In equilibrium, the direction of delegation depends on which concern is stronger and this, it turns out, depends on the political system. In particular, if the majority requirement is large, being a member of the majority coalition is not very bene…cial, since it will have to compensate most of the losers. Bargaining power is then more important, and the principals delegate conservatively, just as predicted by Schelling. If the majority rule is small, however, the majority coalition expropriates a large minority, and divides the revenues on just a few majority members. Political power is then very bene…cial, and districts delegate progressively, as argued by Chari, Jones and Marimon.
The strategic choice of delegate depends on several other parameters, as well. Some of these are details of the legislative game, such as the minority protection, the agendasetting power, the majority coalition's discipline and its stability. The characteristics of the policy are also important, such as the heterogeneity, the expected value of the collective project, and its variance. But in each case, the …rst-best can be achieved by carefully selecting the majority requirement. The voting rule should thus vary across policy areas and political systems. The model is also used to compare decentralization and centralization.
To return to the initial questions, strategic delegation does indeed depend on the political system in general -and the voting rule in particular. This is important for understanding empirical observations, since voting rules do di¤er across both countries and political chambers within the same country. 1 The observation might also be important for the EU, applying various rules for di¤erent decisions and political chambers. The predictions of the model are arguably consistent with some puzzling aspects of the EU: A common view is that the delegates in the Council are more status-quo biased than those in the Commission and the Parliament.
and the Parliament take decisions according to the simple majority rule. Furthermore, the theory predicts that if the president becomes more powerful, the majority requirement should decrease. These two features are, indeed, combined by the new European "constitution".
After a further discussion of the literature, the following section presents the simplest version of the model. Solving the game by backward induction, Section 4 shows how the districts have incentives to either delegate conservatively or progressively, depending on the policy and the political system. The optimal majority rule balances the strategic concerns, and induces a …rst-best selection of projects. Section 5 applies the model to shed light on the trade-o¤s between centralization and decentralization, while Section 6 generalizes the legislative game by discussing the possibility to tax, coalition discipline and stability. The …nal section concludes. Proofs are in Appendix.
Related Literature
As noticed above, there is a controversy in the literature on delegation. Starting with Schelling (1956) , a large bargaining literature shows how principals delegate to status quo biased agents to gain "bargaining power". Schelling's argument is formalized by Jones (1989) and Segendor¤ (2003) in two-player games. Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno (2002) compare majoritarian and proportional systems where three districts delegate to gain bargaining power. With one-dimensional policies, single-peaked preferences and without side payments, Klumpp (2007) shows that voters may delegate to status-quo biased representatives to make their acceptance sets smaller. An n-person bargaining game is studied by Brückner (2003) ; he …nds that the bias may be mitigated by relaxing the unanimity requirement. Besley and Coate (2003) study strategic delegation in a context where two districts maximize joint utility. In a similar model, Dur and Roelfsma (2005) show that the direction of delegation may go either way, depending on the costsharing rules.
Much of the political economy literature goes the other direction, however, arguing that voters may want to delegate to ("progressive") public good lovers since these are likely to be included in the winning coalition (Chari, Jones and Marimon, 1997, Ferejohn, Fiorina and McKelvey, 1987) . Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) and Baron and Diermeier (2001) show how voters consider the induced coalition-formation when electing representatives, although bargaining power is not considered. The trade-o¤ between bargaining power and political power is apparent in the seminal contribution of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) :
In numerical examples, they show that a high probability of being recognized as the next agenda-setter makes the legislator less attractive as a coalition-partner. However, the trade-o¤ is not explicitly discussed and they do not study strategic delegation.
The emphasis on voting rules ties the paper to a large literature going back to Rousseau (1762), Condorcet (1785), Wicksell (1896) , Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and, more recently, Aghion and Bolton (2003) . 3 Wicksell, in particular, argued that unanimity were the appropriate requirement, since otherwise the majority would expropriate the minority. 4 Without delegation, Wicksell would be right in my model. However, every district delegates conservatively if the majority requirement is large, and reluctant representatives implement too few project. Taking this e¤ect into account, the optimal majority requirement should be smaller.
In the model, each district trades o¤ an incentive to gain bargaining power and the desire to be included in the majority coalition. This trade-o¤ is similar to that in Harstad (2005) , and the legislative games are quite similar in the two papers. However, Harstad (2005) ignores the upper boundary on taxes, and the analysis requires there to be transaction costs related to the transfers. More substantially, Harstad (2005) studies optimal incentives to prepare for a collective project, ignoring the incentives to delegate strategically, emphasized in this paper.
3 See also Messner and Polborn (2004) , who show how voters may prefer a super-majority rule as a way of delegating the pivotal role in the future, and Barbera and Jackson (2006) , who explain how heterogeneity within countries determines their optimal voting weights. Unlike Barbera and Jackson (2006) , I am treating a country and its median voter as being the same, thus ignoring heterogeneity within countries. However, such heterogeneity would in any case not be important when side payments are available, as I assume.
4 Buchanan and Tullock (1962) argued that unanimity would imply too high "decision-making costs" and Aghion and Bolton (2003) suggested that the "winners" of a project may not have deep enough pockets to compensate the "losers". The present paper does not include any of these features, giving Wicksell right -where it not for strategic delegation.
The Model

Players and Preferences
Let I represent the set of principals, for example the districts'median voters. The districts must agree to a policy, specifying whether a binary public project is to be implemented and, in any case, a set of transfers. Each district i 2 I (or its median voter, "she") selects a delegate i d ("he"), characterized by his observable type d i 2 <. If d i > 0, i's delegate is "progressive" and generally has a higher value of the project than i herself. If d i < 0, i's delegate is a status quo biased "conservative" who is less in favor of the project than i herself. Formally, i d 's value of the project is given by
where v i is i's own value of the project (net of the cost). If the project is accompanied by a district-speci…c tax or transfer, t i , the utilities of i and her representative becomes:
There is no need for asymmetric information in the model. However, the delegates may represent their districts for many projects and for a long time. Thus, at the delegation stage, there is uncertainty regarding the project that is going to be available, and the bene…ts are not yet known. In other words, after the delegation stage, the project's value is realized:
i and represent some random local and global preference shocks, respectively. It is not important whether i and her delegate are a¤ected by the very same individual shock. The analysis below only uses the combined equation This way, the model describes decision-making and strategic delegation on one dimension, and similar results hold independently for the other dimensions. 
The Legislative Game
After the representatives are appointed and the shocks realized, the legislative game begins. Then, a majority coalition is formed and the coalition members negotiate a proposal.
A clear separation of these two stages makes the mechanism of the model more transparent and easier to study.
First, the majority coalition is formed. Following the prediction of Riker (1962) , a formateur (a political entrepreneur, president or initiator), randomly drawn among the Second, the representatives in M negotiate a policy proposal. The formateur makes the …rst o¤er, but if a proposal is rejected, every coalition member has the same chance of being recognized as the next proposer. Let 2 (0; 1) represent the common discount factor between o¤ers. Each proposal speci…es whether the project should be implemented and, in either case, how to distribute the transfers, with the constraint that the transfers must sum to zero and t i T . T can be interpreted as some minority protection or as the tax paid by every district, if t i measures the net pay from district i after the tax revenues are redistributed.
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After a proposal has been accepted by all the members of the majority coalition, the proposal is submitted to the ‡oor for a vote, and it is implemented if it is accepted by the required majority, m. If the proposal is not accepted, or if the majority members never agree, then the project is not implemented and no-one is taxed (or, equivalently, the tax revenues T are repaid uniformly).
The following section derives the stationary equilibrium of this bargaining game, precluding weakly dominated strategies at the voting stage. Section 6 generalizes the game by allowing (i) jM j 6 = m, (ii) M to be exogenous or randomly drawn, and (iii) transfers to be impossible unless the project is implemented. 6 The reason why only coalition members can make proposals might be that they have committed to reject all other proposals, in line with Baron's (1989) notion of "coalition discipline".
Decisions, Delegation and Voting Rules
This section derives the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game. Solving the game by backward induction, I start by discussing the outcome of the legislative game, taking the delegates'identities as given.
The Legislative Outcome
I start by describing the outcome of the legislative game, before discussing and explaining its intuition. 
(iv) This proposal is accepted by the majority coalition and in the …nal vote.
In Proposition 1, part (iii) …rst states that all minority representatives are fully taxed and given nothing. This is not surprising, since the majority does not need their approval.
These tax revenues, plus the entire surplus of the project, are shared by the majority coalition. The second part of (iii) states that a representative favoring the project more, is taxed more. Intuitively, a delegate's eagerness reduces his bargaining power, and he is hold up by the other coalition members (and the formatour) unless he gives in by transferring some of his bene…ts to them. The equilibrium transfer implies that a representative i d 2 M receives the utility:
Thus, every majority member receives a fraction of the coalition's total value of the project and the taxes expropriated by the minority. This fraction is , what is left after the formateur has expropriated his agenda-setting power, divided by the mass of majority members.
Part (i) follows quite naturally. Since representatives valuing the project more can be taxed more, every formateur prefers to form a coalition with the members that have the highest value of the project.
8 These members do not need (much) compensation for supporting the project -instead they are ready to compensate others. This result is similar to the prediction of a "least costly" minimum winning coalition (Ferejohn, Fiorina and McKelvey, 1987) .
Proposition 1 states that the project is always implemented if the majority coalition's aggregate value of the project is positive. Since the delegates in M make the actual decision, they implement it whenever it is in their interest. And, since M consist of the delegates that have the most to bene…t from the project, the project is implemented too often, relative to what is optimal for the delegates overall. Only if m is large will the majority coalition include most of the delegates, such that the decision takes almost everyone's value into account. If the delegates and their principals have the same preferences, unanimity is therefore optimal in this model. This result con…rms the intuition of Wicksell (1896): If there is no strategic delegation, such that the principals are themselves making the collective decision, then unanimity is the only rule that selects the project if and only if this is optimal. For any smaller majority requirement, the majority will not internalize the cost to the minority, and the project is implemented too often.
The randomly drawn formateur may have a low value of the project and still be a member of the coalition, but his size is negligible.
9 This contrasts much of the literature. Buchanan and Tullock (1962) point to "decision-making costs" when the majority requirement is large; Aghion and Bolton (2003) assume that the winners of a project may not have deep enough pockets to compensate the losers; while in Harstad (2005) there is no constraint on t i , but instead the minority members' participation constraint may bind. The latter assumption enables the majority coalition to always expropriate the entire value of the project, and the If the project is too costly, such that
is not implemented and the majority's surplus T (1 m) is independent of the majority coalition's composition. Suppose, then, that the formatour randomly selects coalition members, giving everyone an expected utility of zero.
Strategic Delegation
At the delegation stage, district i delegates by selecting d i . There are two reasons why i may delegate strategically by choosing d i 6 = 0.
On the one hand, a low d i reduces the transfers to be paid by district i, if i d happens to be in the majority coalition. The reason for this is that a conservative delegate (small
) raises i's bargaining power (bp), since such a delegate is less eager to see the project implemented. This reduces the transfer i has to pay in equilibrium. From Proposition 1:
On the other hand, a high d i makes it more likely that i d becomes a member of the majority coalition, since this coalition consists of the most enthusiastic representatives.
There will be some threshold v m (the (1-m)-fractile of the v d i s) such that all representatives valuing the project more than v m become coalition members, while those valuing the project less become minority members. Thus, a large d i may increase district i's political power (pp). If we, for a moment, take v m as given, then i's representative becomes a majority member if i's district-speci…c shock is such that:
The two forces work in opposite directions. To increase the bargaining power, it is tempting to delegate conservatively, since such a delegate would be better able to receive compensation from the others. To increase the political power, however, it is wiser to delegate progressively. The choice of delegate must balance these concerns. Formally, i's selection is then optimal for every m. This approach, however, requires some transaction costs associated with the transfers. problem is:
where b is the highest at which the project is implemented. Solving this problem gives:
i is large while v 0 and d are small:
The equilibrium d i is given by (4.2).
(ii) All districts delegate conservatively if m, h, v 0 and are large, while T and are small: The equilibrium d is given by (4.3).
(iii) The project is implemented if and only if b , given by (4.4).
The equilibrium d i depends on the value of political power, and this drives the comparative static of Proposition 2.
Part (i) states that district i delegates conservatively if its initial value of the project is large. In this case, i d is quite likely to be included in the majority coalition and, instead of increasing this probability, it is relatively more important to delegate strategically, anticipated the bargaining game. This is best done by appointing a reluctant representative.
If the other districts, on average, are represented by delegates valuing the project a lot (d large), then i would also like to raise her d i . The reason is that when the other representatives are enthusiastic about the project, it is important to be a member of the majority coalition that shares all these values, and this probability increases in d i .
Part (ii) states several comparative statics that hold for d i as well as for d. Most importantly, if m increases, all districts delegate less progressively (or more conservatively).
For m large, it is not that important to become a member of the majority coalition, for two reasons: the minority (1 m) which the majority can expropriate is then small and the total surplus is shared among more majority members. Thus, the gains from political power decrease in m, as does the incentive to delegate progressively. The larger is the majority rule, the less progressively, or the more conservatively, does i delegate.
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Since v 0 i + d i is, in equilibrium, the same for all districts, h measures the heterogeneity in preferences at the legislative stage. If h is large, the probability that i d becomes a majority member increases just a little, when d i increases. Delegating progressively is then not a very e¤ective way of gaining political power, and it is better to delegate conservatively to gain bargaining power instead:
If T is large, it is very important to become a member of the majority coalition, since the minority is taxed by a lot. Thus, the larger is T , the more progressively the districts delegate.
However, if is small, the formatour has a lot of agenda-setting power, and he leaves less surplus for the majority coalition. This makes it less bene…cial to be a member of the majority coalition, and the equilibrium d i decreases in order to gain bargaining power.
If v 0 and , the aggregate uncertainty, are large, then the expected net value of the project is large -conditional on it being worthwhile to implement. Thus, the project becomes more bene…cial, and this larger bene…t is enjoyed whether or not i d should become a majority member. If he does, however, the formatour is expropriating some of the larger bene…t by increasing t i . This cannot be done when the tax is already at its maximum. Hence, when v 0 or increases, being a majority member becomes relatively less important, and the d i s decrease.
The Optimal Voting Rule
The previous proposition points to a status-quo bias when m is large. This is not so because too few projects are implemented from the delegates'point of view: Corollary 1
states that the selection is optimal from the delegates point of view if m ! 1. However, if m is large, all districts delegate conservatively, and reluctant delegates are less willing to implement projects.
The selection of project thus depends on the majority requirement for two reasons.
On the one hand, for d given, the majority coalition implements more projects if m is small since it can then ignore a larger majority, possibly hurt by the project. In isolation, this argument implies that the agents implement too many projects, relative to what is optimal from the agents'point of view (as argued by Wicksell, 1896) . On the other hand, if m increases, all districts delegate to conservative representatives, and these are less willing to implement the public project, compared to what is optimal from the principals' point of view. By carefully selecting m, these two e¤ects cancel. This implies two things. (i) The optimal majority requirement m , satisfying (4.5), increases in T and but decreases in h, v 0 and .
The proof follows simply by equalizing b in (4.4) to the optimal threshold for , which is v 0 .
By interpreting and T , as well as m, as institutional variables, there is a plane of combinations that induces the …rst-best selection of project. One can allow m to 11 Equation (4.5) is valid only if it holds for m 2 (0; 1); requiring that 
Centralization or Decentralization?
In is often di¢ cult to change the institutional rules such as to maximize total welfare.
For example, most legislatures rely extensively on the simple majority rule, even though this is unlikely to be optimal in the theory above. If the legislature uses a voting rule 12 The e¤ect of the project's value (v 0 ) is the opposite of its e¤ect in Harstad (2005) . There, the majority coalition expropriates the entire value of the project while here, the minority cannot be taxed more than T and the formateur captures (1 ) of M 's surplus. Thus, a larger v 0 increases the bene…t of being in the majority coalition in Harstad (2005) , while it reduces this bene…t in the present model. m 6 = m , one can easily calculate the social loss, L m , compared to the …rst-best:
Instead of modifying m, T or , an alternative approach is to take these institutional parameters as given, and instead look for the appropriate level of government. Referring to the above regime as "majority rule", this section makes comparisons to both further "centralization" and "decentralization". The …nal subsection makes a three-way comparison, and illustrates the results in a diagram.
14 5.1. Decentralization
By "decentralization", I refer to a context where the local governments have the authority, such that (i) no district can be forced to participate, and (ii) the representatives are domestic politicians, not only representatives in a national legislature. The …rst feature implies that unanimity is required when decentralized districts consider to implement a collective project. 15 The second feature suggests that it may not be costless for a district to delegate "strategically" under decentralization, since such a politician has domestic power as well. This is the case for the European Council, for example, where the representatives are, …rst of all, ministers (or heads of states) in their home countries.
If district i elects a minister that is biased towards liberalization in agriculture, for example, then he might be so for local decisions as well as for international projects. This creates distortions when the representative has local power. Suppose district i's value of 13 This can be seen, since if the threshold is b 6 = v 0 , to optimal threshold, the social loss is
14 Besley and Coate (2003) also study delegation when comparing decentralization and centralization, and their "non-cooperative centralization" corresponds to my own de…nition of centralization. But instead of studying decentralized cooperation or majority rule, as I do, they refer to decentralization as a situation with no bargaining at all and "cooperative centralization" as a situation where the legislature maximizes the delegates'total utilities. 15 Throughout the paper, I ignore the possibility that a sub-group of districts could implement the project without requiring everyone to do so. Relaxing this assumption leads to a much richer model, left for future research. Delegating to a very progressive minister (d i > 0) is costly since he will liberalize too much also locally. Delegating to a conservative (d i < 0) is costly because he will liberalize too little. These costs are higher the more domestic decisions (n i ) the minister is making.
Note that these costs of delegation will not be present under majority rule or centralization, if the representatives then are di¤erent from the local decision-makers. In those regimes, the voters elect unbiased local representatives, since they will not be engaged in the inter-regional negotiations.
Since unanimity is required, everyone is a member of the majority coalition, and there is no point of delegating progressively. To increase the bargaining power, therefore, d i is going to be negative in equilibrium. And, d i will be more negative if the cost of delegation, c i , is small and if the project is very likely to be implemented (v 0 +d+ =2 large), since then it is more likely that costly delegation will pay o¤. Thus, the project will be implemented too seldom in equilibrium, and the social loss is particularly large if v 0 + =2 is large, while the c i s are small.
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To let be a characteristic of majority rule, assume now that the discount factor approaches one, such that no district has agenda-setting power under decentralization. 16 To see this, notice that the delegate implements a local project if i + d i 0. District i's expected utility of the local policies becomes: Harstad (2008) shows that strategic delegation is still bounded, since that model assumes n < 1 districts. Then, each district will be careful when delegating, taking into account the possibility that their representative may be pivotal and prevent the model from being implemented. The model is used to evaluate the bene…ts of side transfers. and are small, the optimal voting rule m is going to be large and probably larger than m, when m is …xed. The social loss under majority rule, L m , is then large, and decentralization is better.
Proposition 5. Decentralization is better than majority rule ( L
This is the case, for example, for T large, large, c i large, h small, v 0 small and small.
(1 + e c ) v 0 + =2 e c + 1
Centralization
By "centralization', I here mean that one representative, from one of the districts, takes the decision on the behalf of everyone. Since no consent is necessary, the other districts may require to be compensated in advance for the high taxes this "president" is going to set or, equivalently, abandon the possibility to set taxes. Thus, let T = 0 under centralization.
To be consistent, suppose this president is appointed, or elected, at the "delegation stage", i.e., before the shocks are realized. If the president is from district i, and he has the bias This loss depends on i , the shock in district i. Clearly, the expectation of this loss is
that is, if the president has the average value of the project, at least before the shocks are realized. Assume this to be the case.
18 The loss from centralization is then:
We immediately get:
This is the case, for example, for T large, large, h small, v 0 small, and small.
By comparing "centralization" with "decentralization", we get:
This is the case for h small, v 0 large, large and if the c i s are small. 
The Best Regime
Sections 5.1-5.2 compare "decentralization", "centralization" and majority rule (the regime analyzed in Sections 3-4). While majority rule is …rst-best if m = m , the more m deviates from the optimal rule, the less e¢ cient it is. Thus, each of (5.6) and (5.7) gives two conditions for when majority rule is best, one for m < m , and another for m > m .
Together with (5.8), we get …ve conditions describing the best of these three regimes. 
Extensions and Generalizations
The legislative game in Sections 3-4 is simple and it can easily be extended. It builds on three strong assumptions: (i) The composition of the majority coalition M only depends on the project-values, (ii) M is exactly of size m, the majority requirement, and (iii) side transfers are always possible. These assumptions are relaxed, one by one, in the following three subsections. Each extension is discussed in isolation, although it is straightforward to combine them. 
Coalition Stability
In the model above, the majority coalition consists of the representatives with the highest valuation of the project. This arises as an equilibrium phenomenon and it is often simply assumed elsewhere in the literature. 21 In reality, however, there may be other reasons for 19 To avoid strategic delegation, one may be tempted to decide upon the issue before the delegation stage and before the shocks are realized. If the districts, at this stage, commit to always do the project, no matter , the social loss is:
if =2 v 0 , while it is 0 otherwise. Similarly, if the districts commit to never consider the project, the expected social loss is:
if =2 v 0 , while it is 0 otherwise. Of these alternatives, it is clearly better to do the project if v 0 > 0. Compared to the other regimes above, it is better to decide in advance when the project is either almost for sure valuable, or almost for sure not. 20 Another strong assumption is that the majority coalition is formed prior to the bargaining. If everyone could propose and no coalition were formed in advance, the equilibrium would be in mixed strategies, M I d would be random, and so would therefore the -threshold. When is in the range of thethresholds, the project is undertaken with some probability only, and the probability that i 2 M would depend on the random -threshold. For these reasons, such a model becomes too complicated to solve. 21 See, for example, Aghion and Bolton (2003) .
selecting coalition members, not only their valuation of the project.
Suppose that, with probability s, the coalition is formed independently of the v d i s, and every representative has then the same probability jM j = m of being included in M . This may be reasonable, for example, if the policy space is multi-dimensional and deciding on one dimension (or political issue) is not worth the formation of a new coalition. Alternatively, some earlier coalition may already exist and this may be stable with probability s.
If s is large, it is unlikely that a progressive delegate is helpful in gaining political power, and the districts prefer instead to delegate conservatively since this, at least, increases their bargaining power. Thus, if s increases, d i decreases, unless m decreases.
In Figure 2 , increasing s would imply a downward shift in the steepest curve.
At the same time, the socially optimal level of d increases in s. At the optimal voting rule, d < 0, just as before. This implies that when the coalition is random, and not only including the winners, then the project is implemented too seldom. When s increases, this occurs too often and to mitigate this ine¢ ciency, the optimal d should increase towards zero. This can be done by reducing m.
Proposition 8. (i)
The equilibrium d (6.1) decreases in s, (ii) The socially optimal d (6.2) increases in s and, for both reasons, (iii) the optimal m decreases in s.
The function d(m) is the same as before (equation 4.3), and q is the probability that the project is implemented if the majority coalition is independent of the v d i s compared to when it is not. The comparative static with respect to the other parameters turns out to be just the same as before.
A large s is, in practice, associated with less important political issues, for which it is not worth to form a new coalition. This suggests a smaller majority requirement for such issues, to prevent a too conservative delegation on these dimensions. In other words, more important issues should require a larger majority. Similarly, if majority coalitions are quite "stable" for a particular political system, then it should use smaller majority requirements to discourage districts from appointing too conservative delegates.
Coalition Discipline
So far, I have simply assumed that the majority coalition's size is equal to the majority requirement, jM j = m. This is in line with Riker's (1962) prediction of a "minimum winning coalition", and it naturally follows by assuming (i) that minority members can collude (then jM j < m is not enough) but (ii) that they are unable to bribe majority members to reject the proposal (then jM j > m is not necessary). When these assumptions are relaxed, however, the majority coalition may be smaller or larger than the majority requirement.
If assumption (i) is relaxed, such that there is no fear that the minority members should cooperate, the majority coalition can be quite small. Instead of including a fraction m of the delegates, the formateur can create a smaller coalition and simultaneously bribe some representatives in the minority to get the necessary m votes.
If assumption (ii) is relaxed, the majority coalition may fear that some of its members might be bribed to vote against the proposal at the voting stage. To ensure that the policy is …nally approved, one may want to compensate some minority members to vote in favor of the project, just to be sure (Baron, 1989, Groseclose and Snyder, 1996) . A third interpretation of this model is that the policy may be negotiated by a sub-group, often a committee, in the larger parliament. The size of this committee could obviously be m < m, if m is the majority requirement in the legislature. To allow for this interpretation, I let m and m be exogenous, institutional, parameters.
Let M be the set of representatives that end up voting for the project. Thus, M M and M = m: In equilibrium, the minority I d nM is expropriated and taxed T , and this minority will consist of the representatives having the lowest values of the project, just as before. The representatives in M nM are taxed so much that they are just indi¤erent to supporting the project:
Therefore, no matter how the formateur selects M M , the total surplus to be shared
and the equilibrium transfer from i d 2 M is:
Thus, the coalition's total surplus (inside the brackets) is the same no matter M M , and the formateur is indi¤erent to how he selects M M . If, then, the formateur randomly 
Anticipating all this, the principal's problem at the delegation stage is: T . 23 To see this in a simple case, let v If the project is not implemented, it is not possible to "tax" the minority in this way.
This changes the model above. If M can tax the minority if and only if the project is implemented, it is implemented whenever
where b is the threshold derived above. Thus, the project is implemented more often than in the model above, since this is the only way in which the majority can expropriate the minority. The equilibrium delegation becomes
where d(m) is the same as before. So, in this case, each district appoints a delegate that is more progressive, compared to the case above. The reason is that when thethreshold increases, projects are, on average, costlier, and this has the same e¤ect as when v 0 decreases: d i increases. So, in this case, the delegates are more progressive, and any set of delegates would implement the project more often. Clearly, then, the majority requirement should increase, relative to the situation above.
Proposition 10. Assume the minority can be taxed if and only if a project is implemented.
Equilibrium delegation is given by (6.5), and the optimal majority requirement satis…es (6.6).
The proof is similar to those above, and thus omitted.
It is easy to see that the comparative static is just the same as before. With this interpretation, however, one may wonder whether T , the possibility to transfer project- The social loss, compared to the social optimum, is:
The optimal majority requirement is clearly m = 1=2, but otherwise this social loss can be compared to the regimes in Section 5 to determine when an m-rule without transfers is a better idea. By comparing to centralization, for example, an m-rule without transfers is better if
The model in Harstad (2008) builds on this framework, studying when allowing transfers improves ef…ciency. In that model, however, only unanimity rule (m = 1) is considered, there are no individual shocks, and there is a …nite number of principals.
Concluding Remarks
If voters elect representatives strategically, such as to gain political or bargaining power, they implement decisions that are suboptimal for the electorate as a whole. Unfortunately, there are con ‡icting theories on the direction of such delegation, and few studies on how it depends on institutional details. The contribution of this paper is that it shows how districts delegate conservatively or progressively, depending on the political system in general, and the majority rule in particular. If the majority requirement is large, the districts appoint more status quo biased representatives. The direction and magnitude of strategic delegation also depend on the characteristics of the relevant policy and the political system, such as the project's value, its variance, the heterogeneity, the minority protection, the agenda-setting power, the coalition's discipline and its stability. But in each case, the selection of projects is …rst best if carefully selecting the voting rule.
The model is applied to compare decentralization and centralization, taking strategic delegation into account.
The European Union is a relevant example since its rules are subject to change, and since the rules vary across its chambers and policies. 27 While the Commission and the Parliament apply simple majority rules, the Council typically requires quali…ed majorities or unanimity. Based on this, Proposition 2 predicts that the representatives in the Council should be more protectionistic (status quo biased) than the Commission and the Parliament. This indeed seems to be the case, as discussed in the Introduction.
28
Widely interpreted, the results make predictions beyond the relationship between delegation and voting rules. Delegation is often implemented by institutional rules, not necessarily by selecting representatives. For example, Haller and Holden (1997) suggest that groups may require a local super-majority to ratify collective projects. This, in effect, delegates the rati…cation decision from the median voter to a more reluctant citizen, increasing the group's bargaining power. Such delegation is, in this paper, argued to be desirable when the federal majority rule is large. Combined, the prediction is a positive 27 For the current rules, see Hix (2005) . 28 The application to the European Council is a bit more complicated, however. Council members are, …rst of all, domestic politicians and selecting them strategically may be costly -just as analyzed in Section 5.1. correlation between the majority requirements at the federal (or the international) and the local level. Thus, one set of institutions may be strategically designed in the response to another set of institutions. This opens up a large set of questions that should be investigated in future research.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 : Let = R 
so, to maximize , any proposer suggests to implement the project ( = 1) if and only if R 
) and
Notice that (i) follows from maximizing , and (iv) follows since v
Proof of Proposition 2 : Notice that t i is a function of i's shock, t i ( i ). The …rst-order condition of (4.1) is:
where E is taking the expectation over conditional on b . The second-order conditions are trivially ful…lled. Thus, all v This gives the …rst-order condition:
where the project is implemented if
: By introspection, the comparative static is the same as before. QED Proof of Proposition 9 : The …rst-order condition of (6.3) is: (8.12)). QED
